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1. Emotional Appraisal 
 
The aim of appraisal theory in the psychology of emotion is to identify the features of the 
emotion-eliciting situation that lead to the production of one emotion rather than 
another2. A model of emotional appraisal takes the form of a set of dimensions against 
which potentially emotion-eliciting situations are assessed. The dimensions of the 
emotion hyperspace might include, for example, whether the eliciting situation fulfills or 
frustrates the subject’s goals or whether an actor in the eliciting situation has violated a 
norm. Richard Lazarus’s well-known model of emotional appraisal has six dimensions, 
and the regions of the resulting hyperspace that correspond to particular emotions are 
summarized by Lazarus as the ‘core relational themes’ of those emotions. Anger, for 
examples, is elicited by the core relational theme ‘a demeaning offence against me and 
mine’, sadness by ‘having experienced an irrevocable loss’ and guilt by ‘having 
transgressed a moral imperative’ (Lazarus, 1991). 
 
Dimensional appraisal models have traditionally been tested by asking people who have 
experienced a particular emotion to report on the appraisal process, or even by asking 
people to report on the relevance of certain dimensions of evaluation to certain emotions.  
It has therefore been alleged that appraisal theories are based, not on the reality of 
emotion processes, but rather on the image of those processes recorded in folk-wisdom. 
As the leading appraisal theorist Klaus Scherer puts it, some supposedly psychol gical 
studies may in fact ‘do little more than explicate the implicational semantic structures of 
our emotion vocabulary’ (Scherer, 1999, 655). This challenge to appraisal theory can be 
met in a number of ways, including prospective studies that manipulate situational factors 
relevant to the dimensions of appraisal and predict the resultant change in emotion, and 
studies that rely on objective measures of emotional behavior and physiology rather than 
on self-report.  
 
                                         
1 To appear in the proceedings of the Emotions, Evolution and Rationality conference, Kings College 
London, April 2002.  In preparing this paper I am indebted to feedback from the audience at Kings and to 
the comments of Andrea Scarantino on an earlier draft. 
2 For a review of appraisal theories, see (Scher r, 1999). 
The ongoing effort to test appraisal theories as theori  of em tion, rather than as 
elucidations of folk wisdom, has led to a consensus that emotions do not walk in step 
with cognitive evaluation of the stimulus unless the notion of ‘cognitive evaluation’ is 
broadened to include sub-personal processes (Teasdale, 1999). Many appraisal theorists 
have come to accept that even such apparently conceptually complex appraisals as 
Lazarus’s core relational themes can be assessed: 1. Without the information evaluated 
being available to other cognitive processes, 2. Before perceptual processing of the 
stimulus has been completed, and 3. Using only simple, sensory cues to define where the 
eliciting situation falls on the dimensions.  
 
The existence of ‘low-level’ appraisal is demonstrated when emotional responses are 
independent of or conflict with explicit, reportable, action-guiding evaluations; when 
people are afraid of things that they know are not dangerous or disgusted by things they 
know to be healthy. Robert Zajonc’s findings about ‘affective primacy’ are well known. 
He showed that subjects can form preferences for stimuli to which they have been have 
been exposed subliminally so that their ability to identify those stimuli remains at chance 
levels (Zajonc, 1980). Many results have since been obtained which confirm and extend 
this phenomenon. Arne Öhman and his collaborators have conditioned subjects to dislike 
angry faces and subsequently elicited the conditioned emotional response when those 
angry faces were masked by neutral faces so that subjects reported no conscious 
experience of the angry faces (Est ves & Öhman, 1993; Öhman, 1986). In another study, 
subjects were exposed to subliminal images of snakes, spiders, flowers and mushrooms. 
Although the subjects wereunable to identify better than chance the stimuli they had 
been exposed to, subjects with pre-existing snake phobia showed elevated skin 
conductance responses to the snake images and subjects with spider phobia showed this 
response to the spider images (Öhman & Soares, 1994)3.   
 
The original controversy aroused by Zajonc’s concept of affective primacy concerned 
whether emotions involve a ‘cognitive evaluation of the stimulus’ (Lazarus, Coyne, & 
Folkman, 1984; Zajonc, 1984a, 1984b). It has become clear that this was not a helpful 
formulation, and that what is really at issue is whether the information processing that 
leads to an emotional response is separate from that which leads to paradigmatically 
cognitive processes such as conscious report and recall, and whether the two 
informational processes are different in kind. It is not necessary to deny, as Zajonc did, 
that low-level appraisal is a cognitive process. If emotional appraisal proceeds on several 
different cognitive levels, then traditional views about appraisal will still have to be very 
significantly modified. The traditional view, expressed here by Robert Solomon, is just 
too simple: 
 
‘all emotions presuppose or have as their preconditions, certain sorts of cognitions 
- an awareness of danger in fear, recognition of an offense in anger, appreciation 
of someone or something as lovable in love. Even the most hard-headed
neurological or behavioral theory must take account of the fact that no matter 
what the neurology r the behavior, if a person is demonstrably ignorant of a 
                                         
3 For a brief overview, see (Öhman, 2002).  
certain state of affairs or facts, he or she cannot have certain emotions.’ (Solomon, 
1993: 11).  
 
The concept of  ‘multi level appraisal’ combines the recognition 1) that emotions are 
elicited by information about certain aspects of the environment and that the emotional 
response is, in some sense, directed at those aspects of the environment and 2) that these 
states can occur at many cognitive levels, and an appraisal that leads to n emotion can be 
separate from, and can contradict, the appraisal of the same stimulus that is verbally 
reportable and integrated with the organisms other beliefs. The phobic subjects in the 
study just discussed were, in this sense, ‘demonstrably ignorant’ of the st te of affairs that 
was the object of their emotional response. Often, of course, high-level appraisal and 
low-level appraisal march in step with one another, but this is not always the case, and 
the early advocates of affective primacy were fundam ntally correct that even under 
normal conditions there are two (or more) processes going on. Paul Ekman embodies 
these ideas in his concept of an ‘automatic appraisal mechanism’ - a cognit ve subsystem 
that is dedicated to determining whether a stimulus will elicit an basic emotion and which 
is able to operate independently of the cognitive systems that lead to conscious, verbally 
reportable appraisals of the same stimulus (Ek an, 1980; Griffiths, 1990).  
 
The multi-level approach to appraisal has been solidly confirmed in the case of fear by 
the neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux (LeDoux, 1996; LeDoux, 1993). LeDoux distinguishes 
between  ‘cognitive computations’ which yield information about stimuli and the 
relations between them, and ‘affective computations’ which yield information about the 
significance of stimuli for the organism and lead to physiological and behavioral 
responses appropriate to that significance. In fear, and possibly anger, key aspects of 
affective computation occur in the amygdala. The emotional evaluation of a stimulus can 
be driven by inputs at various levels of analysis. At  very early stage of perceptual 
processing, minimally processed data from th lamic sensory relay structures follow  the 
‘low road’ to the amygdala. This is the ultimate 'quick and dirty' route to rapid emotional 
response. Meanwhile, perceptual information follows a slower ‘high road’ to the visual,
auditory, somatosensory, gustatory and olfactory cortices, projections from which t the 
amygdala allow responses to stimuli in a single, sensory modality. Lesions to these 
pathways inhibit emotional responses to stimulus features in the corresponding 
modalities. Finally, the amygdala receives inputs from brain regions associated with full-
blown, polymodal, perceptual representations of the stimulus situation and with memory, 
allowing the emotional response to be triggered by complex, contextual features of the 
stimulus. However it is triggered, it is the final response in the amygdala that is 
associated with fear conditioning, and conditioned fear responses to simple sensory-
perceptual stimuli have been shown to be resistant to extinction.
 
2. Appraisal and the philosophy of emotion 
 
Appraisal theories are the closest scientific equivalents to the theories that have 
dominated philosophy of emotion since the 1960s. Philosophers have analyzed emotions 
in terms of their states of affairs appropriate to them (their ‘formal objects’) (Kenny, 
1963), as evaluative judgments (Solomon, 1976), as evaluative judgments that cause 
bodily arousal (Lyons, 1980), as feelings of comfort or discomfort directed towards an 
evaluative thought (Greenspan, 1988) and as the results of either true belief or uncertainty 
about emotion-inducing situations (Gordon, 1987). For these and many other authors, the 
central aim of a philosophical theory of emotion is to identify the content of an emotion - 
the actual or imagined state of affairs in the world to which the emotion has a semantic 
relationship. In her recent book Upheavals of Thought: The intelligence of emotions, 
Martha Nussbaum uses appraisal theory to capture the idea that emotions are ‘intelligent 
responses to the perception of value’ (Nussbaum, 2001, 1). She describes Richard 
Lazarus’s appraisal theory as ‘in all essentials the view of emotions I have defended in 
Chapter 1’ (Nussbaum, 2001, 109). Nussbaum’s treatment of the emotions in children 
and animals also makes use of something like multi-lev l appraisal. Animals as well as 
humans make the evaluative judgments that constitute emotions according to Nussbaum’s 
theory, but they do so without self-conscious awareness and in such a way that the 
content of their judgments cannot be rendered in language without distortion. 
Nevertheless, she argues, emotion remains primarily an intentional phenomenon. Despite 
the existence of these low-level appraisal that cannot be expressed in language, 
‘...emotions include in their content judgments that can be true or false, and good or bad 
guides to ethical choice’ [Nussbaum, 2001 #6406, 1].  
 
“What we need, in short, is a multifaceted notion of cognitive interpretation or 
seeing-as, accompanied by a flexible notion of intentionality that allows us to 
ascribe to a creature more or less precise, vaguer or more demarcated, ways of 
intending an object and marking it as salient.” (Nussbaum, 2001, 129)  
 
Nussbaum’s description of what is needed for an a equ te account of emotional 
cognition is compelling, but levels of appraisal do not just differ between organisms. 
They also differ within a single organism. Multi-level models of emotional appraisal 
suggest that the same stimulus can be represented in s v ral places in the human brain by 
different representations. Hence it is vital to understand not only what these multiple 
appraisals have in common, but also how they differand how they interact. The existence 
of multiple representations in a ‘hierarchical’ emotional architecture (DeLancey, 2001) 
violates a key assumption of most philosophical reasoning about emotion, which is that 
emotional cognition manipulates emotional representations on the basis of their content, 
and thus that emotional processes can be explored via the semantic ‘logic’ of emotions.  
Multi-level models imply that how emotional and other representations interact, if they 
interact at all, depends on details of cognitive architecture as well as on the content of the 
representations. This architecture, of course, cannot be determined by studying the 
conceptual relations between the contents of emotional representations. Phobias and 
affective primacy phenomena reveal the architecture of the emotion system by showing 
what happens when one level of appraisal operates without the others.  They reveal that 
certain information, such as partially analyzed visual data, is available to one level of 
appraisal and not to another. Another insight is provided by people with ‘flattened affect’, 
who are apparently able to carry out high-level appraisal but not low-level appraisal and 
so do not experience the physiological components of normal emotional response. The 
possibility of flattened affect without intellectual impairment reveals that only low-level 
appraisal has direct connections to the effector systems for the automated components of 
rapid emotional response.  
 
Normal human emotion involves several subsystems that interact, and interact with other 
cognitive subsystems, in ways th t reflect the particular cognitive architecture in which 
they are embedded. This renders the idea that emotions are intentional states whose 
identity is determined by their representational content seriously incomplete, since the 
same state of affairs is multiply represented. If low-level emotional appraisals are not 
merely separate from high-level appraisals but different in kind, that idea becomes still 
more inadequate. Nussbaum (p.127-8) notes that our language may not adequately 
express the content of appraisal processes in animals and perhaps also those of infants. I 
would add adult low-level appraisal processes to this list. Many of the fine-grained 
semantic distinctions we make in ascribing content to thoughts may fail to get a grip on 
representational states with more coarse-grained semantics. Neither ‘aerial predator’ nor 
‘dark thing overhead of such-and-such apparent size and moving thusly’ should really be 
taken as a literal rendition of the ‘what the crow thinks’ before exhibiting aerial predator-
avoidance behavior, although both point to something meaningful (see below). Nussbaum 
suggests that we can cope with this phenomenon using a ‘flexible notion of 
intentionality’. Since this is supposed to allow us to identify what is in common between 
animal and human emotion her idea is presumably that there is some degree of 
isomorphism between the way in which high-level representations relate to one another 
on the basis of their content and the way in which low-level representations relate to one 
another of the basis of their ‘content’. The next two points suggest that this hope will not 
be borne out. 
 
There are likely to be radical differences between the representational states involved in 
low-level and high-level appraisal. Ruth Millikan has suggested that mental 
representations in simple organisms may unite the functions of beliefs and desires in a 
single, undifferentiated functional role. Low-level appraisal in humans seems to manifest 
the same ‘collapse of the attitudes’. Consider the low-l vel appraisal of the core relational 
theme ‘a demeaning offence to me and mine’ that presumably occurs when a soccer 
player is dribbling the ball down the field, another player grabs his jersey causing him to 
lose the ball, and the first player turns angrily towards the second. I suggest that it is 
misleading to say that the relevant brain region believes that the core relational theme has 
been instantiated. Beliefs are mental states that represent how things are and which 
produce action in conjunction with desires- r presentations of how the world should be. 
But in low-level appraisal for anger there is no question as to what action will be taken. 
The frustrated player in our example will orient to the stimulus, produce the pan-cultural
facial expression of anger and undergo physiological changes to prepare them for 
aggressive action.  The ‘affective computation’ in this example is simultaneously the 
belief that the world is a particular way and the intention to act in a particular way. 
Likewise for the better understood case of affective computing of fear in the amygdala, 
and, presumably, for any emotion that has a clear behavioral signature and can be 
induced to exhibit affective primacy. I suggest that it is simply misleading to describe 
low-level appraisal as evaluative judgment, or using any other locution derived from a 
psychology that presumes a fundamental distinction between data and goals. Instead, 
low-level emotional appraisal seems to involve action-oriented representation. I discuss 
below the possibility of capturing the content of such representations using the notion of 
‘affordances’.  
 
Another way in which low- evel emotional appraisal may differ from high-level s in 
terms of the narrow inferential role imposed on low-level representations by the task- 
specific architecture in which they occur. The inferential role of these representations is 
impoverished in three ways. First, low-level appraisal processes do not have access to 
most of what is represented elsewhere in the brain, which is why knowledge t at the 
cockroach in my drink has been completely sterilized does not eliminate the disgust 
response. Hence many inferences that would seem to follow from the content we ascribe 
to this low-level appraisal - in Lazarus’s theory, something like ‘I am taking in or being 
too close to an indigestible object’ - do not actually follow for subjects because they 
cannot recombine that content appropriately with their other contentful states. Secondly, 
the actual processes of affective computing (as opposed to their final output) are not 
available for inspection by other cognitive sub-systems. Once again, architectural barriers 
to information flow block inferences that follow from what otherwise seems the natural 
content to ascribe to those states. Finally, the inferential principles used in affective 
computing are not truth-preserving, but heuristically survival-enhancing. It simply does 
not follow from the fact that I have been poked hard and unexpectedly in the small of my 
back that I have suffered ‘a demeaning offe ce to me and mine’ but the automatic 
appraisal mechanism for anger will reliably draw that conclusion4.
 
There is no scientific puzzle about the nature of information processing in affective 
computing. The forms of inferential impoverishment I have dscribed all make good 
psychological and evolutionary sense. But there is a considerable philosophical puzzle 
about how to ascribe conceptual content to representational states in an isolated cognitive 
subsystem of this kind. If the concepts that figure in the content ascribed to a 
representation do not have their usual inferential role, then what is meant by attributing 
that content? The very idea that the state has conceptual content is thereby called into 
question5. The actual role of the representations involved in low-level appraisal and the 
inferential role of the content-sentences with which we describe those appraisals throws 
strongly suggests that, in this role at least, appraisal theories simply are not theories of 
cognitive content. 
 
 
                                         
4  Some Evolutionary Psychologists would say that the appraisal mechanism has innate knowledge that this 
cue reliably predicts conspecific aggression, or did so in some ancestral environment (Tooby & Cosmides, 
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makes certain logically invalid inferences. 
5 Gareth Evans famously argued that for a state to have conceptual content its elements must be able to be 
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organism (the ‘generality constraint’) (Evans, 1982).  See also Stephen Stich’s discussion of ‘sub-d xa tic’  
mental representations. The ‘beliefs’ of low-level appraisal mechanisms resemble those of Stich’s ‘Mrs T’, 
who remembered that President McKinley was assassinated but was unsure if he was alive or dead (Stich,
1983).  
3. What is appraisal theory a theory f? 
 
The idea that a low-level appraisal and a high-level appraisal can be the same appraisal 
poses the question of what these two processes have in common? According to multi-
level appraisal theories, what they have in common is expressed by the single appraisal 
that can be made at the various levels, an appraisal such as ‘There has been a demeaning 
offence to me and mine’. I have argued that this shared appraisal cannot be understood as 
the shared conceptual content of the various appraisal processes, because it is problematic 
say in what sense low-level appraisal has conceptual content at all. Given the collapse of 
the attitudes and the impoverishment of inferential roles of representational states in low-
level appraisal it makes sen e to describe those appraisal processes as ‘sub-conceptual’. 
Instead, I suggest that multi-level appraisal theories are essentially ecological theories - 
theories of the significance of the environment for the organism. An appraisal hyperspace 
identifies the aspects of the environment that the organism tracks in order to produce 
adaptive behavior in that environment. The relationship between the concepts that figure 
in the appraisal theory’s representation of the environment and the way the organism 
actually tracks those aspects of the environment may be very indirect. Lazarus describes 
the appraisal associated with shame as ‘I have failed to live up to an ego-ideal’ but low-
level appraisal leading to shame may be driven by simple cues that indicate my social 
standing relative to the person with whom I am interacting6. Th  fact that different 
appraisal levels are using different surrogates to track the same ecologically significant 
aspects of the environment helps explain why the different levels sometimes fail to 
coincide on a common appraisal.  
 
There is an important sense in which a particular account of the content of emotional 
appraisal can live a double life, first as a general ecological theory applicable to all 
appraisal levels and second as a theory of the actual conceptual content of the 
representational states being processed in high-level appraisal. An appraisal theory can 
fulfill the first role very well whilst failing in the second role. In fact, abstracting away 
from the details of any particul  psychological process in order to better fulfill the first 
role is likely to produce a worse theory of the actual psychological process of high-level 
appraisal. But if an appraisal theory is not primarily treated as a theory of ‘what the 
person is thinking’ then it becomes possible to recognize that even high-level appraisal 
may not present the stimulus to the subject under the concepts that figure in the best 
theoretical representation of the appraisal hyperspace. For example, if high-level 
appraisal for shame involves moral concepts from the local cultural milieu, such as 
‘dishonour’, whilst low-level appraisal uses simple cues to assess relative social status 
(see fn.5 above), then the core relational theme ‘I have failed to live up to an ego-id al’ is
not an accurate rendition of either the conceptual content of the high-level appra sal or 
the ‘content’ of the low-level appraisal. It may, however, capture a common aspect of 
eliciting situations that can be tracked at many levels. In earlier work on the philosophical 
theories of the content of emotions I discussed the problem of relating the very abstract 
                                         
6 Anthropologist Daniel Fessler has argued that shame is built out of an ancient behavioral system that 
leads to aversive feelings in social interactions where one’s low relative social status is made salient and 
that this basic system continues to operate alongside forms of shame that tie the emotion to concepts of 
responsibility and norm-violation (Fessler, 1999). 
‘analyses’ of emotions like fear, anger and envy found in the philosophical literature to 
the concrete thoughts about particular objects that are preent in an individual’s 
consciousness on a particular occasion of emotion (Griffiths, 1989; 1997, 38-4 ). The 
present suggestion is that greater psychological realism about the conceptual content of 
high-level appraisal processes can be achieved by recognizing that the general gloss put 
on such thoughts in an appraisal theory is an ecological description of the significance of 
the aspects of the environmental that the organism is tracking and not necessarily a 
description of how the organism represents those aspects of the environment to itself.  
 
The idea that appraisal theories are ecological theories of the significance of the 
environment to the organism immediately suggests a teleosemantic treatment of the 
content of emotional appraisals,  treatment that it might be hoped would explain how 
appraisals at all levels could have the same conceptual content7. The idea would be that 
appraisals at all levels for, e.g. fear, have the same content - namely,  ‘I am facing an 
immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger’ - because they have all evolved 
to be triggered by that circumstance. But this proposal does not take the idea of assigning 
conceptual content to a mental representation seriously enough. Teleosemantic programs 
for naturalistic semantics see the fact that some biological systems have the evolutionary 
function of responding to a state of the environment as the fundamental way in which 
‘aboutness’ gets to be a part of the natural world. The sort of genuine intentionality that 
characterizes human thought and language is something that can be explained as a 
sophisticated evolutionary development of this fundamental phenomenon. But that does 
not mean that any biological system with a broadly representational function is 
comparable to those distinctive biological systems like the human mind that achieve full-
blown intentional representation. As I suggested above, low-level appraisal resembles 
just those sorts of proto-intentional representational processes that have been the main 
focus of the teleosemantics literature to date - processes like that by which a frog detects 
a passing fly and strikes at it (Lettvin, Maturana, & McCulloch, 1959).  The idea that all 
levels of appraisal have the same ‘teleocontent’ comes down t  nothing more than what I 
have already argued, namely, that a multi-level appraisal theory describes the ecological 
significance of the aspects of the environment that the organism is tracking by varied 
cognitive means.  
 
Treating appraisal theory as an ecological theory, as opposed to a theory of teleocontent, 
has the advantage that it does not lump together the biological functions of the various 
appraisal levels for an emotion as ‘representing the core relational theme’, as if they were 
redundant ways to perform the same task. It should be clear that low-level ppraisal 
systems are not merely a hangover from the evolutionary past, performing the same 
functions in primitive ways. Rather, the ways in which low-level appraisal conflict with 
high-level appraisal is part of the normal functioning of these systems. Low-lev l 
appraisal ensures that fundamental adaptive actions and action preparedness is engaged 
early and with a low rate of false-negative appraisals. High-level appraisal makes fuller 
use of human cognitive abilities to make an accurate appraisal that will engage flexible, 
                                         
7 For teleosemantic accounts of mental content, see (Dr tske, 1988; Millikan, 1984; Papineau, 1987). Jesse 
Prinz has a specific discussion of teleosemantics and the emotions, but his immediate concern is with what 
affective feelings represent to the organism (Pr nz, Forthcoming). 
longer-term coping strategies. So, rather than being redundant mechanisms performing 
one function, low-level appraisal and high-level appraisal performs separate and 
complimentary functions in relation to the same ecologically significant aspects of its 
environment - dangers, conspecific challenges, and so forth. It is useful to see what low-
level and high-level appraisal have in common, but they are not the same thing. 
 
4. Appraisal and Affordance 
 
I have argued that low-level appraisal involves ‘action oriented’ representations in which 
the functional roles of belief and desire are not distinct. This makes it natural to describe 
the ecologically significant features of the environm t that the appraisal process is 
tracking as ‘action affordances’ - the fact that the environment offers a certain 
opportunity for action. This approach may perhaps be useful for high-leve appraisal as 
well as low-level appraisal. Nico Frijda has argued that the result of emotional appraisal 
is a set of ‘action tendencies’- th  emotion presents the environment to the subject as 
affording certain possibilities for action (Frijda, 1986). 
 
The concept of an affordance derives from J.J Gibson’s theory of, ‘ecological 
perception’. Philosophical discussion of Gibson has focused on his ‘direct realism’ and 
rejection of perceptual representations. The concept of an affordance, however, is 
logically independent of direct realism. In a recent p p r A drea Scarantino has 
presented an analysis of the affordance concept and pointed out the theoretical value of 
considering affordances as objects of perception, independent of any particular theory of 
the perceptual process (Scarantino, In Press). Affordances are organism-relative 
dispositional properties of the environment. The surface of water, for example, affords 
mosquito larvae the possibility of hanging from it so as to keep their breathing tube 
exposed to the air. If the mosquito larva acts appropriately, then this disposition will be 
realized in an act of hanging from the surface. The disposition arises from a conjunction 
of properties of the larvae and their environment. Water does not afford this possibility to 
human infants. Adding petrol to the water reduces the surface tension and destroys the 
disposition.  
 
Scarantino makes two, important, orthogonal distinctions between types of affordances. 
In some cases the eliciting condition guarantees the manifestation of the disposition, 
while in others is only makes it probable. First, therefore, he distinguishes deterministic 
(‘surefire’) affordances from probablistic affordances. Secondly, Scarantino distinguishes 
‘goal-affordances’ and ‘happening affordances’. Goal-affordances are manifested by an 
organism successfully performing a goal-directed behavior - the environment affords the 
performance of that behavior. A member of the opposite sex, for example, offers a 
probabilistic goal-affordance of mating. Happening-affordances are manifested by the 
organism undergoing a passive change. A branch of dubious strength presents an orang-
utang with a probabilistic happening-affordance of falling. These distinctions can both be 
applied to the properties detected in emotional appraisal processes. 
 
Standard presentations of appraisal make emotions appear primarily perceptual. An 
emotion is the recognition that the world is a certain way. Representing the content of 
appraisals as affordances brings out the action-oriented nature of emotion. Shame for 
example, has the core relational theme that ‘I have failed to live up to an ego ideal’. But 
shame also has a characteristic set of behaviors that serve a vital social-communicative 
function (Darwin, 1872; Fessler, 1999). Arguably, the fact that the environment is 
shaming to the subject is a goal- ffordance - the environment affords acceptance of the 
other’s dominance as a social-interaction strategy. In some cases, the action-oriented 
nature of emotion is already present in the ‘coping’ dimensions of appraisal models and is 
simply not highlighted in the usual summaries of those models. The core relational theme 
of anger, for instance, is ‘a demeaning offence against me and mine’, but what this 
actually means in Lazarus’s model includs the organism’s recognition that aggression is 
a viable coping strategy and that aggression may help achieve the organism’s goals 
(Lazarus, 1991). In anger, therefore, what we detect is a goal-affordance for angry 
behavior. Conceiving of anger in these terms makes sense of an intriguing result from a 
retrospective self-r port study of the causes of emotion by Nancy Stein and colleagues. 
They found that an important factor in predicting the occurrence of anger rather than 
sadness as the response to a loss was possibility of obtaining restitution or compensation 
for the loss (Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993).  Sadness, from this perspective, is an 
unusual emotion, since, if the sore relational theme really is ‘I have experienced an 
irrevocable loss’ then sadness is a deterministic happening-affordance, or something 
about which nothing can be done! This poses an obvious question about the adaptive 
utility of the emotion. 
 
 
5. Machiavellian appraisal? 
 
In a recent paper I raised th  possibility that some aspects of the appraisal process might 
be ‘strategic’ or ‘Machiavellian’ (Griffiths, In Press). Organisms may be evaluating not 
just the significance of what has happened, but also the likely outcome of responding to 
that occurrence with one emotion or another. The concept of ‘Machiavellian intelligence’ 
has moved to center stage in recent discussions of the evolution of human cognition 
(Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Whiten & Byrne, 1997). Human intelligenc  is ‘Machiavellian’ 
to the extent that the evolutionary forces which shaped it arose from social competition 
within primate groups. Machiavellian intelligence is the result of an intra-species arms 
race in which increased intelligence at the level of the population merely raises the bar 
for success at the individual level. Like more traditional conceptions of intelligence, 
emotional intelligence is Machiavellian in a general sense simply to the extent that it has 
evolved to mediate social competition.  
 
It seems to be common ground that the expressionof emotion is strategic, and so, if it has 
an evolutionary history, is Machiavellian in the above sense. The role of social context in 
determining emotional expression has long been recognized through Paul Ekman’s 
concept of a ‘display rule’ (Ekman, 1971, 1972) and has been more heavily emphasized 
by recent ‘transactionalist’ accounts of emotion (Fridlund, 1994; Russell & Fernández-
Dols, 1997). The contextual factors that predict whether an emotion is expressed are of 
the sort that are likely to have been significant in human evolution - factors such as 
conformity to group standards and the status of the individual in the group - and so the 
sensitivity of emotional expression to uch factors is very plausibly part of our evolved 
social competence. This need not imply, of course, that the specific rules to which 
individuals conform in one culture or another can be explained in evolutionary terms. 
Evolution can be equally relevant whe  the task is to understand how cultures generate 
their patterns of difference from a shared developmental system. The generic fact that 
there are display rules, for example, is very likely to have an evolutionary explanation 
even if these rules differ radically across cultures.  
 
If the Machiavellian expression of emotions is common ground amongst evolutionary 
theorists of emotion, the idea that the actual production of emotion is influenced by 
‘strategic’ considerations remains more controversial (Ekman, 1997). I have embodied 
this idea in the ‘Machiavellian Emotion Hypothesis’, which suggests that emotional 
appraisal is sensitive to cues that predict the value to the emotional agent of responding to 
the situation with a particular emotion, as well as cues that indicate the significance of the 
stimulus situation to the agent independently of the agent’s response (Griffith , In Press). 
Put in the language of appraisal theories, the hypothesis is that the appraisal hypersp ce 
has ‘strategic’ dimensions. The organism evaluates the stimulus situation not only along 
multiple dimensions that assess the significance of what has happened, but along 
dimensions that assess the significance of what will likely happen if the emotion if 
produced. In current appraisal models, some strategic considerations are embodied in 
‘coping’ related dimensions. Putting the hypothesis in terms of affordances, it states that 
emotional appraisal detects goal-affordances. 
 
There is some suggestive evd nce of Machiavellian appraisal in primates. The neural 
connectivity of the amygdala in primates is consistent with the hypothesis that its activity 
is facilitated or inhibited by the perception of social contextual cues (Emery & Amaral, 
2000: 167). Behavioral studies of primates also support the idea that adults assess the 
likely outcome of the emotional interaction when producing emotional behavior. William 
Mason reports that rhesus macaques deprived of social contact as infants produce gro sly 
normal facial behaviors expressive of fear (grimace), friendliness (lipsmacking) and 
threat (threat face) (Mason, 1985). What seems to be lacking in these animals is an ability 
to utilize these facial expressions to manage their relationships with other monkeys. They 
are, as it were, emotionally clumsy. Mason explains these results in terms of the role of 
social experience in elaborating complex eliciting conditions for emotional behavior. 
Infant monkeys begin by producing these behaviors in response to relatively simple, 
context independent stimuli. Later on, “As a result of functional elaborations, 
refinements, and transformations of the schemata [of elicitors for expressive behavior] 
present in early infancy, experience creates new sources of social order, new possibilities 
for the regulation and control of social life.” (Mason 1985: 147). The monkeys, in other 
words, learn to produce the same emotional behaviors in response to subtler aspects of 
social context, and by doing so are able to manage their social interactions with other 
animals. It is possible to argue that these findings are accounted for purely by evolved 
mechanisms for the Machiavellian expression of emotions - subordinate Rhesus monkeys 
feel angry when dominant mokeys search their cheek pouches for food, but never 
display this anger. I would argue, however, that that this hypothesis adds an unnecessary 
layer of complexity to account for the behavior. 
 
What would a Machiavellian theory of human emotions look like?  Numerous emotion 
theorists have suggested that emotions may be self-serving, occurring not when the 
situation objectively warrants the judgment embodied in the emotional appraisal, but 
rather when it suite the agent to interpret the situation in this light. Jean Pau  Sartre 
famously takes this view (Sartre, 1962). According to Sartre, for example, anger ascribes 
to a person the property of being hateful precisely because he stands between the agent 
and the satisfaction of her desires. That is the difference between the emotion of anger 
and rational coping with the conflicting needs of others. Emotions as Sartre describes 
them are intrinsically pathological - a form of bad faith in which people reject reality out 
of mental weakness. But the central insight of his theory is independent of this value-
judgment. It is simply that people can use emotions to view the world in a light that is 
psychologically more rewarding to us than other possible interpretations. Highly adaptive 
versions of this process are described in the literature on ‘emotional intelligence’, such as 
using an emotional reinterpretation of the situation to motivate oneself (Salovey, Bedell, 
Detweiler, & Mayer, 2000). From the perspective of the emotional intelligence literature, 
Sartre’s work seems like an insightful account of human psychology marred by the 
French philosophers penchant for calling a spade a conspiracy against the soil.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Emotional appraisal happens at more than one level. Low-level appraisals involve 
representations that are semantically coarse-grained, fuse the functional roles of belief 
and desire and have impoverished inferential roles, making it best to think of them as 
sub-conceptual. Multi-level theories of emotional appraisal a e thus best conceived, not 
as theories of the actual conceptual content of emotional appraisals, but as ecological 
theories that identify the aspects of the environment that appraisal processes are tracking 
using diverse cognitive means. These aspects of the nvironment arewhat the 
environment ‘affords’ the organism. Some of these affordances are ‘go l-affordances’ - 
possibilities for future action. This perspective on emotional appraisal lends support to 
the idea that emotional appraisal is in part ‘Machiavellian’ or ‘strategic’. Organisms take 
into account the payoffs resulting from an emotio al response when determining whether 
the eliciting situation ‘warrants’ that emotion. 
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